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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 20050586-CA 
VAL GEORGE TEHERO, 
District No. 041905050 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. The Defendant was 
sentenced to formal probation for thirty-six months. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WAS DEFENDANT DETAINED FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN OFFICER HAMMOND 
STOPPED HIM AS HE WAS RIDING HIS BICYCLE? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact should be analyzed 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of 
law should be reviewed under a correction of error standard of review. "In 
reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, in reviewing the court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Constitution of the United States 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003)- Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. (R. 004). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 049-50) An evidentiary hearing was 
held on February 22, 2005, in front of the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan. (R. 
52-53). After giving the parties an opportunity to further the matter, the Court 
heard oral arguments on April 5, 2005. (R. 81-82). The Court took the matter 
under advisement. On April 12, 2005, the Court denied Defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence. (R. 83). There were no findings of fact and conclusions 
of law prepared. On April 26, 2005, Defendant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. (R. 88-
89). He was sentenced on June 7, 2005, to thirty-six months of formal 
probation. (R. 90-92). The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed 
on June 8, 2005. (R. 90-92). A timely notice of appeal was filed on July 1, 
2005. (R. 93). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 31, 2004, Officer Hammond ("Hammond") of the Ogden 
Police Department was working patrol. He was wearing a police uniform and 
was driving a marked police vehicle. (R. 104/3-4). At approximately 10:30 
3 
p.m. Hammond was driving southbound on Washington Boulevard. (R. 
104/5). He noticed the Defendant riding his bicycle on the sidewalk. The 
Defendant was traveling northbound and crossed through the crosswalk 
between 16th and 17th streets. (R. 104/6). Hammond testified that he was 
concerned with the Defendant riding his bike in this area because it's a high 
crime area and there are a lot of drugs in the area. (R. 104/7). 
Hammond also believed that the Defendant was suppose to have a light 
on the front and rear of the bike. (R. 104/7). Hammond made a U-turn and 
started driving northbound in the Defendant's direction. (R. 104/8). The 
Defendant had ridden approximately one hundred yards when Hammond 
pulled into a driveway that was about fifteen feet behind the Defendant. (R. 
104/8, 10, 22). The Defendant was fifteen feet in front of where Hammond 
stopped his car. Hammond didn't activate his lights or siren. The Defendant 
looked back and noticed Hammond stopping his patrol car. (R. 104/10). 
Hammond got out of his car. The Defendant stopped riding his bike, as he 
looked back at Hammond. (R. 104/10-11, 22). Hammond walked towards the 
Defendant and asked him if he had any identification. (R. 104/10-11, 22). 
Defendant didn't have identification, but he told Hammond his name. (R. 
104/11). Hammond then used his radio that he wears on his waist to check if 
there were any warrants on the Defendant. (R. 104/11). 
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Hammond didn't have any reason to believe that Defendant had violated 
the law other than he believed that Defendant had violated the law when he 
rode his bike through the intersection. (R. 104/23). When Hammond stopped 
the Defendant he didn't ask the Defendant if he would talk to him. (R. 
104/24). Hammond testified that it was standard police procedure to run a 
warrants check. Hammond testified, "When I stopped him, it was for the going 
through the intersection." (R. 104/24). Defense counsel stated, "But that 
wasn't illegal was it?" Hammond answered, "Well, no, it wasn't." 
Defense counsel said, "And you had no reasonable suspicion that he was 
involved in any other criminal activity, correct?" 
Hammond answered, "Well, other that just the general area of the city 
that he was in at that time." (R. 104/24). 
Defense counsel asked Hammond why he stopped Defendant when he 
didn't stop everyone that was out on Washington Boulevard at 10:30 at night 
on a summer night. Hammond answered, "When I saw him go through that 
intersection." Hammond also testified that, "I knew that you could ride on the 
sidewalk, but once he entered the roadway, I was under the impression that he 
needed a light." (R. 104/25). 
Hammond couldn't remember how long the warrants check took, but he 
testified that it usually takes anywhere from twenty seconds to two minutes to 
5 
run a warrants check on someone. (R. 104/13-15). Hammond testified that 
there wasn't a conversation between he and the Defendant while he was 
waiting for the warrants check and that the Defendant didn't make any effort to 
leave. (R. 105/15). The Defendant stayed seated on his bicycle while they 
were waiting for the warrants check. (R. 105/16). Hammond discovered that 
Defendant had a warrant for his arrest and Defendant was placed in handcuffs. 
Hammond estimated that the total time that lapsed from when he approached 
the Defendant until the Defendant was in handcuffs was three minutes. (R, 
104/16). 
Hammond testified that during the encounter he never told Defendant 
that he was free to leave. (R. 104/17). Hammond also testified that it was 
"level one" stop and that Defendant would have been free to leave at any time. 
Hammond testified that "I wouldn't have chased him, I wouldn't have tackled 
him, anything like that." (R. 104/17). 
In Hammond's police report he wrote that he stopped the Defendant for 
riding his bike without lights. (R. 104/20). 
After Defendant was placed in handcuffs he was searched incident to 
arrest. (R. 104/16-17). Hammond found methamphetamine during the search 
incident to arrest. (R. 104/17). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court incorrectly assessed the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing in finding that the encounter was a level one encounter. 
The officer clearly stated in the probable cause affidavit that the defendant 
"was stopped for riding a bike with no lights." (R. 11) Although on the 
witness stand during the suppression hearing the officer said that he drove up 
behind the defendant in his marked police car, and the defendant voluntarily 
stopped, his testimony thereafter indicates that the defendant was not free to 
leave. The officer testified that after getting out of his car approaching the 
defendant that he asked the defendant for his identification. Once the officer 
takes that step, the encounter would clearly escalate to a level two encounter, 
requiring reasonable suspicion. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion 
that defendant had committed any type of crime; and, therefore, according to 
established case law the stop was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Any evidence obtained after that a legal stop 
constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree and should be excluded from evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well 
as Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides in 
relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
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papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated." 
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement officers and the general public. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions 
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) 
an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed. 
State v. Deitrnan, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(citations omitted). The 
encounter between Defendant and Officer Hammond was a level two stop that 
was not supported by reasonable suspicion. A level one encounter "is a 
voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is 
free to leave at any time." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In contrast, a level two stop occurs "when a reasonable person, in view 
of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." Id. It 
is a level two stop "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention brief" State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
A "totality of the circumstances" test should be employed to determine if a 
stop is a level two stop that requires reasonable suspicion. Under the totality of 
the circumstances, this was clearly a level two stop. Officer Hammond turned his 
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marked patrol vehicle around, drove to where Defendant was riding his bike and 
then pulled in directly behind the Defendant. When the Defendant stopped riding 
his bike, the officer got out of his vehicle, approached the Defendant and asked 
him if he had any identification. 
Since Officer Hammond initiated a Level II stop, he needed "specific, 
articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was 
about to commit a crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The official record is void of any written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. However, the trial court made oral findings at the conclusion of the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. The Court found that the following facts gave 
Officer Hammond reasonable suspicion that justified the initial detention. 
At the time of the stop Officer Hammond believed he was stopping the 
Defendant for a violation. This is clear from the probable cause affidavit, the 
officer's police report as well as the officer's testimony. During the suppression 
hearing, Officer Hammond acknowledged that it wasn't illegal to ride a bike on 
the sidewalk without a light on. However, he attempted to change the semantics 
of his encounter with the Defendant. Since the State acknowledged that it didn't 
have reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant, this case hinges on whether 
Officer Hammond's stop was a level one voluntary encounter or a level two 
seizure where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Again, the facts 
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need to be analyzed in their entirety. The officer turned his vehicle around and 
drove directly to where the Defendant was riding his bike. The officer then turned 
in directly behind the Defendant. Although the officer didn't activate his red and 
blue lights the Defendant stopped riding his bike. The officer then approached the 
Defendant and demanded identification. (R. 104/23). Although the Defendant 
didn't have identification he told the officer his name. The officer never said, "Do 
you mind if I talk to you?" (R. 104/24). The officer immediately began running a 
warrants check. Under these facts, a reasonable person would not feel free to just 
ride away. There is no question that in this matter the Defendant was not free to 
leave, as the officer was clear in his report and testimony that he believed a 
violation of the law had occurred. 
Judge Heffernan was incorrect when she found that the Defendant was free 
to leave. In her oral ruling she stated, "the fact of the matter is he was free to 
leave." (R. I A). She also stated that "a reasonable person should have realized 
that they were free to leave." (R. /4). This finding was in error and in conflict 
with the officer's initial report. The officer did testify on direct examination that 
the Defendant would have been free to leave. Officer Hammond testified, "It 
would have been a level one stop. We ask people to talk to us all the time and 
they say no, they walk away. And I wouldn't have chased him, I wouldn't have 
tackled him, anything like that." (R. 104/17). 
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This testimony is in direct conflict with a probable cause affidavit the 
officer filled out the night of the arrest and with the officer's police report. In the 
probable cause affidavit, Hammond wrote, "Val was stopped for riding a bike 
w/no light." (R. Oil). In his police report Hammond wrote, "I stopped the male 
in the 1600 block of Washington Boulevard." (R. /29). 
On cross-examination, Officer Hammond said, "When I stopped him, it 
was for the going through the intersection." (R. 104/24). Later on cross-
examination, Officer Hammond was asked, "Why did you stop him?" 
Hammond's answer was "Like I said, when I saw him go through the 
intersection." (R. 104/25). 
On re-direct examination the prosecutor said "and when we keep using this 
word stopped, did you actually stop the defendant?" To which Hammond 
answered, "No. I - there was no - there was - it was not a stop." (R. 104/27). 
Officer Hammond then testified, "He saw me pull in behind him and he stopped." 
The prosecutor responded with "And you went over to him." Officer Hammond 
answered, "yes." (R. 104/27). 
What is clear from Hammond's reports and testimony is that regardless of 
whether he activated his lights, he was stopping Defendant for riding a bike 
without a light. It was disingenuous of him to testify that the Defendant was free 
to leave at any time, and was also factually incorrect when the trial court found 
that Defendant was free to leave. Defendant is cognizant of the fact that when a 
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seizure occurs is objective and depends "on when the person reasonably feels 
detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is no longer free to 
leave." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court 
find that the trial court erred in ruling that the stop of the Defendant was a level 
one encounter. Since the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
warrant check based on a level two encounter, the Defendant's constitutional 
rights were violated and the exclusionary rule requires the evidence be 
suppressed. The Defendant therefore requests this court reverse the trial court 
and remand for a suppression of the evidence. 
DATED this [£ day of December 2005. 
DpE wrsMim 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief KifAp^ellant to 
Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the.PlaMff, 160 East 300 South, 6th 
Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, pdstage prepaid thifc M> (Jay 
of December 2005. j / / P o / f 
Attorney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COUR^ 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
.j;s\v 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
VAL GEORGE TEHERO, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041905050 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: June 7, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: RICHARD PARMLEY 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 4, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: H060705 Tape Count: 352 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/26/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. Defendant is present with 
counsel, Martin Gravis. The Court proceeds with sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. •'I 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
o r o 
P a g e 1 JD18494298 
041905050 TEHERO,VAL GEORGE 
Case No: 041905050 
Date: Jun 07, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 72 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$555.00 
$0.00 
$268.51 
$555 . 00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$555 . 
$0 
$268, 
$555, 
Plus 
00 
51 
00 
Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 72 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.00 which includes the surcharge 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse 
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary, paying all costs, 
directed by Adult Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
its 
to 
as 
Page 2 0 f 'i 
Case No: 041905050 
Date: Jun 07, 2005 
The defendant shall obtain a GED or high school diploma. 
The defendant shall receive credit for any jail time already 
served. 
The defendant shall reimburse Weber County $500.00 for public 
defenders representation, payable through Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall submit to warrantless search, seizure and 
chemical testing. 
The defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of $500 or complete 
100 hours of community service. 
The defendant shall abide by a 7:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew for 90 
days, beginning today. 
The Court advises the defendant a prison term may be imposed if 
probation is violated. 
Dated this day of 
District Court Judge 
PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Page 3 (last) 0 C 2 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT 
ss 
Booking Date: y-M-vi 
oy-liyft 
CONCERNING THE ARREST AND 
CONTINUED DETENTION OF: 
iJte T^TfBTzn 
D.O.B. (1H^" 
Time: 1 Z 3 ^ WCJ Booking #: 
Comes now the undersigned, who is a peace officer of the State of Utah, being first duly sworn on his/her oath, and swears and 
deposes that probable cause exists for the arrest and continued detention of the above-named individual, based upon the following 
information which is either personally known to the undersigned or is information obtained by the undersigned as a result of his/her 
capacity as a peace officer. <£_-,. -n X^^J 
The above-named individual was arrested on 0 ~> \\$~\
 % for tne following criminal offense(s): 
V 1) V'WJ •EEV\ 
2) 
3). 
4). 
The undersigned submits the following statement of propable cause ndersignpii submits the lollawing statement ot propable cause: \ > 
•-^ /T7c •/?.<.-.,n K/V f/V-f" >z_l ^ersrso Po^ i~m:r: no* a )%h\/(f -M fvs fiioin—r^Vti V » A trn > 
The undersigned believes that probable cause existed for the arrest of the above-named individual and that probable cause exists 
for the continued detention of the above-named individual and therefore requests the court to sign the Order of Detention which is a 
part hereof, allowing for the continued detention of the above-named individual. 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn on his/her oath, swears and deposes that the information contained herein, including 
any information contained in exhibits attached hereto, such as police reports or other documents, so far as the same relates to the existence 
of probable cause, is true and correct to the undersigned'sfpersonal belief is true and correct based upon the understanding and belief of 
the undersigned. ^ | /[ 
DATED this J * day of \ J \ iA i> 
AFFIANT: (Please Print). M0KM 
Dept. Telephone ] _ AFFIANT Si 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this_ _day of 
JUDGE or NOTARY PUBLIC 
ORDER: 
Based upon the above affidavit, the undersigned, who is a duly appointed or elected magistrate in Weber County, State of Utah, 
finds and concludes that probable cause does exists for the arrest and continued detention of the above named arrestee. 
DATED this day of_ _, 20_ 
MAGISTRATE: 
The arrestee above will be released automatically 48 hours from the time of booking unless a magistrate signs the order and such order 
is returned to the jail before that time. If the judge has refused to sign the order, the arrestee will be released with a reasonable period 
of time not to exceed 48 hours. The 48 hours shall expire on (Date) at (Time) . 
LJ Copies were distributed in the following manner: White - Jail. Yellow - Prosecutor. Pink - Arresting Agency f\ \ 1 
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I KNOW YOU'RE GONNA BE GONE FOR A WHILE, SO — 
MS. BEATON: RIGHT. I JUST NEED ENOUGH TIME TO WRITE 
SOMETHING UP AND THEN --
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MS. BEATON: — FOR US TO HAVE THE ORAL ARGUMENT, SO WE 
COULD PROBABLY EVEN PUT IT ON A REGULAR CALENDAR IF YOU'D 
LIKE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, LET'S GO AHEAD ANYWAY. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. THE STATE CALLS OFFICER HAMMOND. 
OFICER HAMMOND, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION. 
A. OFFICER HAMMOND. POLICE OFFICER, OGDEN CITY. 
Q. OFFICER HAMMOND, HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR THE OGDEN 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT? 
A. OVER FOUR YEARS NOW. 
Q. AND WHAT DO YOU DO FOR OGDEN CITY? 
A. PATROL OFFICER. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. WERE YOU WORKING PATROL ON AUGUST 31ST, 
2004? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AT APPROXIMATELY 10:30 AT NIGHT, WHAT WERE 
4 
1 YOU DOING AT THE TIME? 
2 A. JUST ROUTINE PATROL. 
3 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU SAY ROUTINE PATROL, DOES MEAN THAT 
4 YOU WERE IN A UNIFORM THAT EVENING? 
5 A. YES, MA'AM. 
6 Q. ALL RIGHT. AND WERE YOU DRIVING A MARKED POLICE 
7 VEHICLE? 
8 A. I WAS. 
9 Q. AND WHERE WERE YOU DRIVING AT ABOUT 10:30 AT NIGHT? 
10 A. SOUTHBOUND ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD ABOUT AROUND 17TH 
11 STREET. 
12 Q. OKAY. IF WE COULD JUST DIAGRAM THIS GENERAL AREA IN 
13 WHICH THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) DRAWING. 
14 OKAY. SO ON THE DIAGRAM, NORTH --
15 A. NORTH'D BE POINTING UP --
16 Q. -- UP IN THIS DIRECTION. 
17 A. THIS WILL --
18 Q. AND — 
19 A. THIS'LL BE 17TH STREET. THIS IS WASHINGTON. 
20 Q. OKAY. 
21 A. THE INTERSECTION, I MEAN IT'S NOT EXACTLY STRAIGHT 
22 ACROSS. IT CANTS A LITTLE BIT ON 17TH STREET GOING THROUGH 
23 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
24 Q. OKAY. WHERE WERE YOU DRIVING AT THE TIME THAT THIS 
25 INCIDENT HAPPENED? 
5 
A. LET'S SEE, WELL, THIS — THIS WILL BE 1700 WASHINGTON, 
THIS'LL BE 1600 WASHINGTON WITH THIS BEING 17TH STREET. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. WANT ME TO MOVE JUST A LITTLE BIT? 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S OKAY. 
THE WITNESS: OKAY. I WAS DRIVING SOUTHBOUND ON 
WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) OKAY. AND AT THE TIME THAT YOU'RE 
DRIVING SOUTHBOUND ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, DID YOU SEE 
ANYBODY IN THE STREET? ANYWHERE IN THAT AREA? 
A. I DID. 
Q. OKAY. AND ABOUT WHAT TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT IS THIS? 
A. ABOUT 10:30 AT NIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. IS IT DARK AT THAT TIME? 
A. IT IS. THERE WERE STREET LIGHTS. 
Q. WERE THERE OTHER PEOPLE IN THE AREA THAT WERE OUT ON THE 
STREET AT THIS TIME? 
A. NORMAL VEHICULAR TRAFFIC. 
Q. IS THIS YOUR PATROL (UNINTELLIGIBLE)? 
A. IT IS. 
Q. OKAY. SO AS YOU'RE DRIVING SOUTHBOUND THEN, WHO DO YOU 
SEE OUT IN THE STREET AREA? 
A. THERE'S A -- THERE'S A SIDEWALK LIKE SO. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. THIS --
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1 Q. AND YOU'RE SHOWING ON THE 16TH -- THE 1700 --
2 A. YEAH, CORRECT. 
3 Q. — BLOCK, SEVEN — 1600 BLOCK. 
4 A. THIS IS THE OLD PEPSI BUILDING THAT'S NOW — I DON'T 
5 KNOW WHAT IT IS NOW, BUT IT WAS THE OLD PEPSI BUILDING. 
6 Q. OKAY. 
7 A. I NOTICED A MALE RIDING A BICYCLE BASICALLY JUST RIGHT 
8 IN FRONT OF THE PEPSI BUILDING. 
9 Q. OKAY. NORTHBOUND OR SOUTHBOUND? 
10 A. NORTHBOUND. 
11 Q. OKAY. SO THE INDIVIDUAL ON THE BIKE, YOU NOTICED THE 
12 MALE. DID YOU RECOGNIZE THAT MALE? 
13 A. NO (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
14 Q. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THE MALE IN THE COURTROOM? 
15 A. I DO. 
16 Q. WHERE IS HE SEATED? 
17 A. THE DEFENDANT. 
18 Q. OKAY. LET THE RECORD SHOW HE'S IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT 
19 IN THIS CASE. YOU SEE THE DEFENDANT RIDING A BICYCLE. IS HE 
20 WITH ANYONE? 
21 A. NO. HE'S ALONE. 
22 Q. OKAY. AND WHERE DID HE RIDE HIS BIKE? 
23 A. JUST CONTINUED ON NORTHBOUND ON THE CROSSWALK, ACROSS — 
24 THROUGH THE INTERSECTION AT 17TH AND WASHINGTON, BACK UP THE 
25 SIDEWALK INTO THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON. 
/ 
Q. OKAY. DID HE CONTINUE TO RIDE HIS BIKE THE ENTIRE TIME? 
A. HE DID. 
Q. WERE YOU CONCERNED AT ALL ABOUT THE DEFENDANT RIDING HIS 
BIKE IN THIS AREA? 
A. YES, THERE — THERE'S A LOT OF — THERE'S A LOT OF FOOT 
TRAFFIC, LOT OF VEHICLE -- OR NOT — BICYCLE TRAFFIC IN THAT 
AREA. IT'S -- IT'S A HIGH CRIME AREA. THERE'S A LOT OF 
MOTELS IN THAT AREA, LOT OF DRUG USE IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA. 
Q. SO DID YOU SUSPECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS VIOLATING SOME 
PARTICULAR STATUTE --
A 
Q 
A 
I DID --
— BY RIDING HIS BIKE AT THIS TIME OF NIGHT? 
I DID. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU THINK THAT HE WAS VIOLATING? 
A. BY HIM ENTERING THE ROADWAY HERE. 
Q. ON 17TH --
A. ON 17TH STREET ACROSS -- OR CROSSING THE INTERSECTION. 
PAST DUSK, A BIKE IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE A LIGHT ON FRONT AND 
REAR — 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
OKAY. 
— OF THE BIKE. 
AND THAT WAS YOUR CONCERN. 
YES. 
OKAY. SO DID THE DEFENDANT CONTINUE TO RIDE NORTHBOUND 
THEN UP INTO THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD? 
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1 A. YES, HE DID. 
2 Q. WHAT DID YOU DECIDE TO DO? 
3 A. I -- LIKE I SAID, I WAS TRAVELING SOUTHBOUND. EXCUSE 
4 ME. I MADE A U-TURN WHEN IT WAS SAFE TO HEAD NORTHBOUND ON 
5 WASHINGTON. 
6 Q. OKAY. 
7 A. THERE WAS -- LIKE I SAID, THERE'S A RENTAL COMPANY IN 
8 THE 1600 BLOCK — WELL, THERE'S A MORTUARY OR A FUNERAL HOME, 
9 MORTUARY RIGHT HERE, AND THEN JUST TO THE NORTH OF THAT, 
10 THERE'S THE RENTAL YARD. 
11 Q. OKAY. 
12 A. THEY HAVE A FENCE AND A DRIVEWAY RIGHT HERE. I TURNED 
13 INTO THAT DRIVEWAY. IT KIND OF GOES ACROSS THE SIDEWALK. 
14 KIND OF OFF TRAFFIC SO I WASN'T STICKING INTO TRAFFIC. BY 
15 THIS TIME, THE PERSON ON THE BICYCLE WAS --
16 Q. FARTHER — 
17 A. — FURTHER — FURTHER NORTH THAN ME. 
18 Q. OKAY. SO WHEN YOU -- WHEN YOU PULL IN THEN, DO YOU DO 
19 ANYTHING BY PULLING INTO THIS PARKING AREA NEXT TO THIS 
20 RENTAL COMPANY THAT OBSTRUCTS THE DEFENDANT FROM CONTINUING 
21 ON WHAT APPEARS TO BE HIS ROUTE WHICH IS NORTHBOUND? 
22 A. NO. I PULL -- I PULLED BEHIND HIM. 
23 Q. OKAY. SO WHY DON'T YOU GIVE ME AN IDEA AS TO -- WHY 
24 DON'T YOU MARK YOUR CAR IN BLUE AND THEN MARK APPROXIMATELY 
25 WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS WHEN YOU PULLED INTO THIS DRIVEWAY 
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AREA. 
A. OKAY. HERE'S THE LARGE — FROM THE SIDEWALK TO THE 
STREET, IT'S — THERE'S THIS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) LIGHT. 
Q. OKAY. 
A. I PULLED UP AND --
THE COURT: CAN YOU MOVE OVER SO I CAN --
THE WITNESS: OH, I'M SORRY, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: -- SEE A LITTLE BIT? OKAY. THANK YOU. 
THE WITNESS: I PULLED UP INTO THIS AREA HERE --
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) WERE YOU --
A. -- VEHICLE FACING --
Q. --IN -- WERE YOU OFF THE ROAD IN THE DRIVEWAY AREA? 
A. YES. THERE WAS MAYBE TWO FEET OF MY VEHICLE STILL ON --
ON WASHINGTON BOULEVARD. 
Q. IS IT ONE OF THOSE ROADS THAT YOU COULD PARK OUT ON THE 
STREET? 
A. ON, YEAH. PEOPLE PARK ALONG THE CURBLINE ALL THE TIME. 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU'RE NOT OBSTRUCTING — 
A. NO. 
Q. -- TRAFFIC OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
A. NO. 
Q. AND THEN IN RED, WHERE WOULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE BEEN ON 
HIS BIKE? 
A. HE WAS -- THE SIDEWALK'S STILL HERE. HE WAS IN THIS 
AREA — IN THIS AREA HERE. 
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1 Q. OKAY. APPROXIMATELY COULD YOU GIVE US AN IDEA AS TO 
2 ABOUT WHAT THE DISTANCE IS BETWEEN WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS 
3 FROM WHERE YOUR CAR WAS LOCATED? 
4 A. TEN, 15 FEET FURTHER NORTH THAN MY CAR. 
5 Q. OKAY. AND WHEN -- YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND HAVE A SEAT. 
6 WHEN YOU -- DID YOU ACTIVATE YOUR LIGHTS AND SIRENS? 
7 A. NO, I DID NOT. 
8 Q. DID YOU EITHER MAKE ANY KIND OF HAND GESTURE OR ANY 
9 STATEMENT TO THE DEFENDANT THAT YOU WANTED HIM TO STOP? 
10 A. NO. HE LOOKED BACK AND NOTICED ME PULLING IN — 
11 Q. AND HOW --
12 A. -- AND STOPPED. 
13 Q. THE DEFENDANT JUST STOPPED ON HIS OWN. 
14 A. YES. 
15 Q. OKAY. DID YOU DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO CONTINUE 
16 TO REMAIN WHERE HE WAS? 
17 A. NO. I ACTUALLY APPROACHED HIM. 
18 Q. OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU APPROACHED HIM THEN, DID YOU — DID 
19 YOU PULL YOUR GUN AT ANY POINT, GET OUT ANY HANDCUFFS? 
20 A. NO. 
21 Q. ALL RIGHT. AT ANY POINT IN TIME DID ANY OTHER OFFICERS 
22 COME TO THE SCENE TO BACK YOU UP? 
23 A. NO. 
24 Q. SO IT'S JUST -- ARE YOU THE ONLY PERSON IN YOUR CAR? 
25 A. YES, MA'AM. 
11 
Q. ALL RIGHT. SO WHEN YOU GET OUT OF YOUR CAR THEN, DID 
YOU WALK DIRECTLY OVER TO THE DEFENDANT? 
A. YES. 
Q. DID YOU EVER LAY HANDS ON THE DEFENDANT OR TOUCH HIM IN 
ANY FASHION? 
A. NO. 
Q. OKAY. WHEN YOU APPROACHED THE DEFENDANT, WHAT DID YOU 
SAY TO HIM? 
A. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD SOME IDENTIFICATION. 
Q. AND HOW DID THE DEFENDANT RESPOND? 
A. HE JUST IDENTIFIED HIMSELF HAS VAL TEHERO. 
Q. OKAY. DID HE TELL YOU WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY KIND OF 
IDENTIFICATION CARD OR DRIVER'S LICENSE ON HIM? 
A. NO. 
Q. HE DIDN'T HAVE ONE? 
A. (WITNESS SHAKES HEAD.) 
Q. OKAY. AT THE TIME THAT YOU FIRST HAD THIS CONVERSATION 
WITH THE DEFENDANT, DO YOU EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT YOU SUSPECT 
THAT HE MAY BE VIOLATING THE BICYCLE STATUTES OR DO YOU HAVE 
ANY CONVERSATION AS TO HIM — AS TO WHY YOU'D ACTUALLY TURNED 
AROUND AND STOPPED? 
A. I -- I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAD THAT CONVERSATION. I ASKED 
HIM FOR HIS -- I ASKED HIM WHO HE -- OR FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
HE IDENTIFIED HIMSELF. AND THEN AT THAT POINT, DID JUST MY 
STANDARD ROUTINE, CHECKING FOR WARRANTS. 
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Q. OKAY. AND WHEN YOU SAY YOU CHECKED HIM FOR WARRANTS, 
DID THAT REQUIRE YOU TO ACTUALLY GO BACK TO YOUR CAR? 
A. I — WE DO IT OVER OUR POLICE RADIO. 
Q. OKAY. AND YOU'RE POINTING TO A RADIO THAT YOU'RE 
WEARING ON YOUR UNIFORM? 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. SO THIS IS SOMETHING THAT YOU WERE WEARING THAT 
PARTICULAR EVENING? 
A. EXACTLY AS I'M DRESSED NOW. 
Q. SO WHEN YOU APPROACH THE DEFENDANT AND YOU ASK HIM FOR 
THIS AND HE GIVES YOU HIS NAME, DO YOU NEED ANYTHING OTHER 
THAN HIS NAME IN ORDER TO RUN HIM FOR WARRANTS? 
A. NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. DID YOU EVER HAVE TO LEAVE THE DEFENDANT 
THEN WHILE THIS PROCESS WAS TAKING PLACE? 
A. NO. 
Q. WHEN YOU ACTUALLY REQUEST A WARRANTS CHECK, WHAT DO YOU 
HAVE TO DO? 
A. IT — ON THE RADIO DIAL HERE --
Q. IT'S A RADIO THAT YOU WEAR ON YOUR WAIST? 
A. YES. WE OPERATE — THERE'S — THERE'S 15 DIFFERENT 
CHANNELS ON THIS RADIO. WE OPERATE ON CHANNEL 1. IF WE 
WANNA CHECK DRIVER'S LICENSE, WARRANTS, ANYTHING LIKE THAT, 
WE SIMPLY SWITCH THIS LITTLE DIAL SEVEN TIMES TO CHANNEL 8, 
GOING FROM CHANNEL 1 TO CHANNEL 8, IT TAKES ABOUT ONE SECOND 
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TO DO. ADVISE THE DISPATCHER WHAT WE'RE REQUESTING. IN THIS 
CASE IT WOULD BE FOR A WARRANTS CHECK. THE DISPATCHER 
REPLIES THAT SHE — OR SHE — SHE REPLIES BACK THAT SHE'S 
READY TO -- FOR ME TO GIVE HER THE INFORMATION. I GIVE HER 
THE NAME AND SHE RUNS A WARRANTS CHECK. 
Q. OKAY. SO ABOUT HOW LONG DOES THIS PROCESS TAKE THEN TO 
GET A WARRANTS CHECK? 
A. I WOULD SAY ANYWHERE BETWEEN ABOUT 20 SECONDS AND NOT 
MORE THAN AT THE FURTHEST EXTREME TWO MINUTES. 
Q. OKAY. WHAT CAUSES A DELAY IN RETURNING INFORMATION ON A 
WARRANTS CHECK? 
A. DEPENDING ON HOW MANY OFFICERS ARE WORKING AT THE TIME. 
FRIDAY, SATURDAYS — THURSDAY, FRIDAY, SATURDAY NIGHTS TEND 
TO BE A LITTLE BIT BUSIER, MORE OFFICER, MORE PE — MORE 
OFFICERS RUNNING INFORMATION. THIS WAS ON A TUESDAY NIGHT. 
THERE'S ONLY 16 OFFICERS WORKING. GENERALLY, TUESDAYS ARE A 
LITTLE BIT SLOWER. WE ONLY HAVE, LIKE I SAID, THERE'S ONLY 
TWO SQUADS ON, SO 16 OFFICERS. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THE 
SERVICE CHANNEL, HER ONLY SOLE PURPOSE IS TO RUN INFORMATION 
FOR US SO WE DON'T TIE UP OUR PRIMARY CHANNEL. 
Q. ON THIS PARTICULAR EVENING, DO YOU RECALL WHAT, YOU 
KNOW, KIND OF RADIO TRAFFIC THERE WAS? 
A. IT WAS LIGHT. I MEAN NORMAL — IT WASN'T EVEN NORMAL. 
Q. IS THERE ANYTHING ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S LAST NAME WHICH 
WOULD INDICATE TO YOU THAT THIS WARRANTS CHECK WOULD BE 
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FASTER THAN OTHERS? 
A. YES. WHEN YOU RUN A WARRANTS CHECK, IT PULLS UP 
ALPHABETICALLY THE CLOSEST NAME THAT WE RAN DOWN. IF WE WERE 
TO RUN JOHN SMITH, A COMMON NAME, THERE WOULD BE A LOT --
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, I'M GONNA OBJECT. I DON'T KNOW 
WHERE THIS IS GOING. HE CAN TESTIFY HOW LONG THIS WARRANT 
CHECK TAKE — 
THE COURT: YEAH --
MR. GRAVIS: -- IF HE HAS -- IF HE CAN REMEMBER, BUT --
MS. BEATON: I THINK WHAT I'M GETTING AT IS, DO YOU 
THINK THIS IS CLOSER TO THE 20-SECOKD MARK OR DO YOU THINK 
IT'S CLOSER TO THE TWO-MINUTE MARK, AND I'M HAVING HIM 
EXPLAIN WHY HE THINKS IT'S CLOSER TO 20 SECONDS THAT HE WAS 
STANDING THERE. I THINK IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE AS TO WHETHER 
OR NOT — THE COURT IS GONNA DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS 
JUST A POLICE ENCOUNTER WITH A CITIZEN ON THE STREET OR 
WHETHER OR NOT IT'S GONNA BE SOMETHING MORE EXTENDED IN TERMS 
A DETENTION OR SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. 
MR. GRAVIS: MAY I VOIR DIRE THE WITNESS? 
THE COURT: GO AHEAD. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW 
A. IT WAS A VERY SHORT 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW 
LONG IT TOOK THAT NIGHT? 
TIME. 
LONG? 
1 
ACTUAL SECONDS, MINUTES, NO. 
MR. GRAVIS: NOTHING FURTHER. I OBJECT TO THIS LINE OF 
QUESTIONING? IF HE DOESN'T REMEMBER — 
THE COURT: I THINK HE'S TESTIFIED TO HIS RECOLLECTION. 
AT'S PROBABLY THE BEST EVIDENCE OF WHAT IT IS AND HE SAID A 
SHORT TIME AND HE'S NOT ABLE TO SPECIFY HOW LONG, SO IT --
'S GONNA REQUIRE ME TO SPECULATE WHETHER IT WAS 20 SECONDS 
OR TWO MINUTES, NO MATTER WHAT HE SAYS AT THIS POINT BECAUSE 
GENERAL PRACTICE AND WHAT HAPPENED ON THIS NIGHT MAY NOT HAVE 
BEEN WHAT HAPPENED ON SOME OTHER NIGHT SO, YOU KNOW, I THINK 
IT'S PROBABLY NOT HELPFU1 
MS. BEATON: ...:.. 
THE COURT: FJ'R DETERMINATION. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONT'D. 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. OFFICER HAMMOND, THEN, AS YOU'RE STANDING THERE WAITING 
FOR THIS INFORMATION BACK FROM THE DISPATCHER, DO YOU HAVE A 
CONVERSATION WITH THE DEFENDANT? 
i 
NO, THERE WAS NO -- THERE WASN'T REALLY A CONVERSATION. 
20| Q. AT ANY POINT IN TIME WHEN YOU'RE DEALING WITH THE 
22 
23 
24 
25 
••TENDANT PRIOR TO RECEIVING THE INFORMATION BACK FROM THE 
DISPATCHER, DOES THE DEFENDANT EVER MAKE ANY EFFORT TO LEAVE? 
A. NO. 
Q. DO YOU EVER DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DEFENDANT FROM 
LEAVING? 
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1 A. NO. 
2 Q. DOES THE DEFENDANT — YOU'D INDICATED THAT HE HAD A 
3 BICYCLE. DID THE DEFENDANT EVER GET OFF HIS BICYCLE? 
4 A. NO. 
5 Q. DID YOU EVER ASK HIM TO, YOU KNOW, THROW HIS LEG OVER 
6 THE BAR AND, YOU KNOW, STAND OFF AWAY FROM THE BICYCLE? 
7 A. NOT UNTIL HE WAS OBVIOUSLY PLACED IN HANDCUFFS ~ 
8 Q. OKAY. 
9 A. — NO. 
10 Q. SO DURING THIS INITIAL PERIOD OF TIME, HE CONTINUES TO 
11 SIT ON HIS BICYCLE? 
12 A. YES, MA'AM. 
13 Q. ALL RIGHT. DID HE HAVE -- DID THE TWO OF YOU EVER HAVE 
14 A CONVERSATION AS TO WHY YOU WANTED THE DEFENDANT TO REMAIN 
15 OR DID YOU TELL HIM THAT YOU WANTED HIM TO REMAIN? 
16 A. I — I ASKED HIM HIS NAME. I RAN FOR THE WARRANTS. I 
17 FOUND OUT HE HAD A WARRANT. PLACED HIM IN HANDCUFFS. I MEAN 
18 THERE WASN'T -- THERE WASN'T MUCH — IT WAS A VERY SHORT 
19 TIME. THERE WASN'T AN EXTENDED CONVERSATION. 
20 Q. ALL TOGETHER BETWEEN THE PERIOD OF TIME WHERE YOU WALK 
21 UP TO THE DEFENDANT AND THE TIME HE'S PLACED INTO HANDCUFFS, 
22 HOW LONG WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT TOOK? 
23 A. MAYBE THREE MINUTES TOTAL. 
24 Q. OKAY. AND IN ADDITION TO THAT PERIOD OF TIME, WHAT ELSE 
25 DO YOU DO AFTER YOU'VE DETERMINED THAT HE HAS A WARRANT FOR 
1 
HI:.; ARRESTS 
A. PLACED HIM IN HANDCUFFS AND CONDUCTED A SEARCH INCIDENT 
TO ARREST. 
Q. AND DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE DEFENDANT? 
Q. WHAT DID YOU FIND? 
A CRYSTAL SUBSTANCE IN A BAG. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHAT DID YOU SUSPECT THAT TO BE? 
A. METHAMPHETAMINE. 
Q. IF THE DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE WARRANTS CHECK WOULD HAVE, 
YOU KNOW, RODE OFF ON HIS BIKE OR MADE ANY EFFORT TO LEAVE, 
WOULD YOU HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO LEAVE AT THAT TIME? 
A. HE WOULD HAVE BEEN — IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A LEVEL ONE 
STOP. WE ASK PEOPLE TO TALK TO US ALL THE TIME AND THEY SAY 
NO, THEY WALK AWAY. AND I WOULDN'T HAVE CHASED HIM, I 
WOULDN'T HAVE TACKLED HIM, ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
n UKAi . Iii MIL pill I II Jl'i j. Ml,il .A. THAI u 'I JVEKoA I luN, 
DTD YOU EVER SAY TO HIM, YOU'RE FREE TO GO IF YOU WANT? 
A I DID NOT SAY THAT, NO. 
Q. OKAY. BUT DID YOU EVER AT ANY POINT DO ANYTHING TO 
SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE NEEDED TO REMAIN THERE? 
* NO. 
0 NOW, EVEN WHILE YOU'RE RUNNING THE WARRANTS CHECK, DOES 
ANi OFFICER hA K1J JIL,T HAPPEN UPON YOU AND PULL UP? 
IT DOES HAPPEN, YES. 
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Q. DID IT HAPPEN IN THIS CASE? 
A. NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. SO THE ENTIRE TIME, IT'S JUST YOU AND THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. YES, MA'AM. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND THE HANDCUFFS DO NOT COME OUT UNTIL THE 
DEFENDANT IS ACTUALLY -- YOU'VE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS A WARRANT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. THE LIGHTS AND SIRENS ON YOUR CAR, DID YOU 
EVER ACTIVATE THOSE? 
A. NO. 
Q. NOT AT ANY POINT BOTH BEFORE OR AFTER THE DEFENDANT'S 
ARREST? 
A. UH-UH. 
Q. YES OR NO? 
A. NO, I DIDN'T. NO, THEY WERE NEVER ACTIVATED. 
Q. I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS — OH, YOU KNOW, I DO HAVE 
ONE QUESTION. IN THE REPORT THAT YOU WROTE, ON PARAGRAPH 2 
IT SAYS I STOPPED THE MALE IN THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON. 
DID YOU ACTUALLY DO ANYTHING TO STOP THE DEFENDANT — 
A. NO. 
Q. — IN THE 1600 BLOCK? 
A. NO. HE WAS -- THERE WAS NO LIGHTS, THERE WAS NO SIRENS, 
THERE WAS NO STOP (UNINTELLIGIBLE). IT WAS NOT A -- IT WAS 
U H J L N T K L L i G l B L h ) . 
Q. WHY DID YOU USE THE WORD STOPPED? 
A. I GUESS FOR A LACK OF BETTER WORDS, HE STOPPED HIS 
MOTION. HE - - HE STOPPED. 
ii ; , i | i i i n - i " H I I , , ' I .Mil wr 'VF H O P I N G W'~>UI D H A P H ' T I , 1 ASST1MF' 
A. YES. 
Q. BUT DID YOU MAKE ANY HAND GESTURES, ANY STATEMENTS, 
ANYTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THAT'S WHAT — 
A. NO. 
— YOU WANTED THE DEFENDANT ' 
NO. 
] : ALL RIGHT. ;- ;" FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GRAVIS: 
Q. OF COURSE YOU -- THE FIRST TIME YOU TOLD MS. BEATON 
ABOUT THIS WAS AFTER THE 11TH OF JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, RIGHT? 
IS THAT WHEN -- WHAT DAY WAS THAT? 
Q. THAT WAS THE DAY THIS -- THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS 
"",LD, CORRECT? 
A. IF THAT, YEAH — 
WHEN SHE TALKED TO YOU ABOUT THE FACTS FOR THE 
SUPPRESSION MOTION, CORRECT? 
WE -- WE HAD -- WE TALKED BRIEFLY. 
Q. OKAY. AFTER THAT DATE, THOUGH. 
A. 
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1 Q. DID YOU TALK TO HER ON THE PHONE AFTER THAT DATE ABOUT 
2 WHAT HAPPENED? 
3 A. SHE TOLD ME THAT IF SHE WASN'T GOING TO NEED ME, SHE 
4 WOULD CALL ME. SHE DID LEAVE A MESSAGE. 
5 Q. OKAY. AFTER THAT DATE? 
6 A. SHE REQUESTED THAT I SUBMIT THE STATE STATUTE ON THE 
7 BICYCLE. 
8 Q. OKAY. DID YOU TALK TO HER ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT YOU 
9 STOPPED THE DEFENDANT, TOO? 
10 A. WE TALKED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. 
11 Q. TALKED ABOUT THE WHOLE THING. OKAY. AND THAT WAS AFTER 
12 THE 11TH OF JANUARY OF THIS YEAR. 
13 A. YES. 
14 Q. OKAY. NOW, IT'S NOT A VIOLATION OF STATE LAW TO RIDE A 
15 BICYCLE ON THE SIDEWALK, IS IT? 
16 A. NO. 
17 Q. AND YOU DON'T HAVE TO HAVE LIGHTS ON A BICYCLE IF YOU'RE 
18 RIDING ON THE SIDEWALK AFTER DARK, CORRECT? 
19 A. CORRECT. 
20 Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY OGDEN CITY STATUTE THAT SAYS THAT? 
21 A. NO. 
22 Q. BUT IN YOUR REPORT, YOU SAID YOU STOPPED HIM FOR RIDING 
23 HIS BIKE ON THE — WITHOUT LIGHTS, CORRECT? 
24 A. BECAUSE HE CROSSED THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. 
25 Q. HE CROSSED THROUGH THE INTERSECTION IN A CROSSWALK, 
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CORRECT? 
A. YES 
3 AND ON THE 11TH OF JANUARY, YOU TOLD ME AND MRS. BEATON 
4 THAT THE LIGHT WAS PROPER, SO HE WASN'T JAYWALKING. 
5 NO, HE WASN'T. 
6| Q. HE CROSSED LEGALLY IN THE CROSSWALK. 
7 YES, SIR. 
8J Q. AND A PEDESTRIAN DON'T NEED LIGHTS ON TO C^CSS LEGALLY 
9 IN A CROSSWALK AFTER DARK, CORRECT? 
10 A. NO, SIR. 
11 Q. FACT, THE STATE STATUTE SAYS A BICYCLE THAT'S ON THE 
I ' lUDEWALK HAS THE SMIL RIGHTS AMD PUT I !• S AS A PEDESTRIAN, 
13 CORRECT? 
YES. 
15 Q. SO HE DIDN'T NEED LIGHTS ON TO CROSS THE CROSSWALK, DID 
16 HE? 
1 1 I A T\JO . 
••>. YOU'RE SAYING YOU PULLED — WHERE WAS HE AT WHEN YOU 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
i p 
A. HE WAS SHOULD HAVE MARKED IT. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO 
">INT? 
Q. YEAH. 
A. OKAY. HE WAS — HE WAS IN THIS AREA RIGHT -- RIGHT IN 
HERE. 
Q. OKAY. AND WHERE WERE YOU AT? 
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A. I WAS DRIVING SOUTHBOUND. 
Q. WHERE EXACTLY SOUTHBOUND WERE YOU AT? 
A. I WOULD SAY CROSS — RIGHT HERE NEARING — CLOSING — 
GETTING CLOSE TO THE INTERSECTION. 
Q. OKAY. SO AS YOU'RE GOING THROUGH THE INTERSECTION, YOU 
NOTICE THAT HE'S GOING --
A. NORTH. 
Q. -- GOING NORTH AND HE'S CROSSING THE CROSSWALK. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU IMMEDIATELY FLIP A U-TURN AND PULL IN RIGHT 
BEHIND HIM, CORRECT? 
A. I GO DOWN TO WHERE IT'S SAFE, MAKE A U-TURN, 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. OKAY. THAT ONLY TAKES A FEW SECONDS, RIGHT? HE DOESN'T 
GET VERY FAR NORTHBOUND RIDING HIS BIKE, DOES HE? 
A. WELL, THAT'S -- THAT'S ABOUT MAYBE A HUNDRED YARDS. 
Q. OR LESS. 
A. COULD BE LESS, COULD BE MORE. 
Q. BUT THEN YOU PULL IN RIGHT BEHIND HIM, CORRECT? 
A. I PULL IN BEHIND HIM, YES. 
Q. YOU GET OUT- OF YOUR CAR. HE STOPS, LOOKS AROUND, AND 
THE FIRST THING YOU ASK HIM IS IF HE HAD ANY IDENTIFICATION? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU DIDN'T SAY, COME HERE, CAN I TALK TO YOU? 
A. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD IDENTIFICATION. HE STOPPED — 
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2 J A. I'M SORRY. 
3 i THAT'S THE VERY FIRST THING YOU SAID TO HIM, CORRECT? 
A. HE STOPPED HIS BIKE. I APPROACHED HIM. ASKED HIM IF HE 
HAD SOME I UK! IT 1 FT TAT 1 ( >N . 
Q. OKAY. AND THEN WHEN HE SAID HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
IDENTIFICATION, HE SAYS HIS NAME'S VAL TEHERO, CORRECT? 
A. CORRECT. 
Q. AND YOU IMMEDIATELY RAN HIM FOR WARRANTS, CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, DID YOU HAVE ANY BELIEF THAT HE'S 
INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY? 
A. AT THAT POINT IN TIME, OTHER THAN CROSSING THROUGH THE 
INTERSECTION. 
Q. WHICH ISN'T A VIOLATION OF THE LAW, THOUGH, RIGHT? 
A. NO. 
SO OTHER THAN THAT, DID YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE 
THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY? 
NO. 
Q. THEN WHY DID YOU RUN HIS NAME FOR WARRANT? 
A. JUST IF I CONTACT SOMEBODY ON THE STREET, I RUN 'EM, 
CHECK 'EM FOR WARRANTS. 
Q. AND THAT PERSON -- YOU NEVER TOLD HIM HE WAS FREE TO GO. 
ASKED HIM FOR IDENTIFICATION, RIGHT? YOU 
NEVER TOLD HIM WHY — WHY YOU WERE TALKING TO HIM OR EVEN 
24 
1 ASKED PERMISSION TO TALK TO HIM, RIGHT? 
2 A. I DIDN'T SPECIFICALLY ASK, DO YOU MIND IF I TALK TO YOU, 
3 NO, I DIDN'T SAY THAT. 
4 Q. YOU DIDN'T ASK HIM ANY PERMISSION. YOU JUST ASKED HIM 
5 IF HE HAD ANY I.D., THEN RUN HIM FOR WARRANTS, CORRECT? 
6 A. YES. 
7 Q. AND YOU SAY THAT'S JUST STANDARD PROCEDURE, CORRECT? 
8 A. WELL, IF I -- WHEN I STOPPED HIM, IT WAS FOR THE GOING 
9 THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. 
10 Q. BUT THAT WASN'T ILLEGAL, CORRECT? 
11 A. WELL, NO, IT WASN'T. 
12 Q. SO LEGALLY, YOU COULDN'T HAVE STOPPED HIM FROM GOING 
13 THROUGH THE INTERSECTION, CORRECT? 
14 A. CORRECT. 
15 Q. AND YOU HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED 
16 IN ANY OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, CORRECT? 
17 A. WELL, OTHER THAN JUST THE GENERAL AREA OF THE CITY THAT 
18 HE WAS IN AT THAT TIME. 
19 Q. 1700 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, WASHINGTON 
20 BOULEVARD'S A MAIN ROAD, IT'S 10:30 AT NIGHT. PEOPLE CAN 
21 WALK UP AND DOWN THE SIDEWALK, CORRECT --
22 A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
23 Q. — WITHOUT BEING INVOLVED IN ANY CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
24 A. SURE. 
25 Q. YOU NEVER SAW HIM DO ANYTHING SUSPICIOUS? 
25 
1 A. NOT NECESSARILY SUSPICIOUS. 
2 Q. IT'S NOT EVEN -- IT'S NOT LIKE IT'S THREE O'CLOCK AT 
3 NIGHT. IT'S 10:30 AT NIGHT ON A — ON A SUMMER NIGHT, 
4 CORRECT? IT'S NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE PEOPLE WALKING ON 
5 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD IN THAT AREA AT NIGHT, IS IT? 
6 A. THERE'S NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE WALKING THAT TIME OF NIGHT, 
71 ?:"). 
8 Q. BUT IS IT UNUSUAL? DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY YOU SEE 
9 WALKING — 
10 A. NO, IT'S NOT UNCOMMON. 
11 Q. DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY YOU SEE RIDING A BIKE OR WALKING 
12 ON THE SIDEWALKS ON THE 1700 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD? 
13 A. NOT EVERY PERSON, NO. 
14 Q. THEN WHY DID YOU STOP HIM? 
15 A. LIKE I SAID, WHEN I SAW HIM GO THROUGH THE INTERSECTION, 
16 Q. OKAY. BUT THAT WASN'T ILLEGAL. 
AT THAT TIME, I -- WHEN HE — WHEN HE ENTERED THE 
18 ROADWAY, I KNOW — I KNEW THAT YOU COULD RIDE ON THE 
19 SIDEWALK, BUT ONCE HE ENTERED THE ROADWAY, I WAS UNDER THE 
20 IMPRESSION THAT HE NEEDED A LIGHT. 
21 Q. BUT THAT WAS WRONG, CORRECT? 
22 A. YES, IT WAS. 
23 Q. PEOPLE RIDE BIKES ON WASHINGTON ALL THE TIME. DO YOU 
STOP EVERYBODY THAT GOES — CROSSES --
25 MS. BEATON: OBJECTION. ASKED AND ANSWERED. 
26 
MR. GRAVIS: NO, IT'S NOT. 
MS. BEATON: YEAH IT WAS. 
MR. GRAVIS: I'VE NOT FINISHED EVEN. 
THE COURT: WELL, JUST LET'S GET IT ANSWERED AND LAWYERS 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
Q. (BY MR. GRAVIS) DO YOU STOP EVERYBODY WHO CROSSES ACROSS 
A CROSSWALK WITHOUT LIGHTS ON THEIR BIKE? 
A. IF I — IF — UP UNTIL THAT POINT, IF I SAW THEM CROSS 
THE -- IF I SAW THEM ENTER THE ROADWAY, YES, THEY'D BE 
STOPPED. 
Q. OKAY. BUT THE -- LIKE I SAY, YOU NEVER SAID ANYTHING 
ABOUT WHY YOU STOPPED HIM UNTIL AFTER YOU RAN THE WARRANTS 
CHECK; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. AND THE ONLY CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH HIM IS 
WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD ANY IDENTIFICATION, CORRECT? 
A. IT WAS A VERY BRIEF CONVERSATION. 
Q. AND THAT'S THE ONLY CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH HIM. 
A. YES. I ASKED HIM FOR I.D. I RAN HIS NAME. 
MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
THE COURT: ANYTHING ELSE? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. BEATON: 
Q. NOW, AT THE TIME THAT YOU ASKED THE DEFENDANT FOR 
IDENTIFICATION, DID HE GIVE YOU ANYTHING? 
11 
h ,in , T ii r . ii. i ii,. 
Q. SO HE JUST VERBALLY TOLD WHAT YOU HIS NAME 1",. 
A YES, MA'AM. 
Q. DID YOU EVER ACQUIRE ANYTHING FROM HIM, YOU KNOW, ANY 
KIND OF CARDS OR ANYTHING TO SUPPORT THE FACT THAT THAT WAS 
WHAT HIS NAME WAS? 
A. JUST HIS NAME AND DATE OF BIRTH. 
Q. OKAY. \N THAT, YOU HAVING A CONVERSTAION 
WITH THE DEFENDANT, YOU DID NOT ACQUIRE ANYTHING BELONGING TO 
'••^ ENDANT. 
NO. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND WHEN WE KEEP USING THIS WORD STOPPED, 
1 i.ID YOU ACTUALLY STOP THE DEFENDANT? 
IX • THERE WAS NO — THERE WAS — IT WAS NOT A 
Q. HE STOPPED, YOU STOPPED — 
A. HE SAW ME PULL IN BEHIND HIM ' _ - '. 
Q. AND YOU WENT OVER TO HIM. 
A. YES. 
Q. OKAY. NOW, JUST SO WE'RE ALL CLEAR, AT THE TIME THAT 
THIS INCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON AUGUST 31ST, 2004, IS IT YOUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE 
RIDING HIS BIKE OUT IN THE INTERSECTION WITHOUT A LIGHT 
"^FIXED TO HIS BIKE? 
A. YES, THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING. 
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Q. 
ANY 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
AND DID HE 
TYPE OF 
NO, HE 
DID HE 
NO. 
OKAY. 
TIME. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
BY 
Q. 
IT WAS. 
OKAY. 
IT WAS. 
HAVE ANY 
LIGHT AFFIXEE 
DID NOT. 
HAVE ANY 
AND 
MS. BEATON 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THAT 
I 
BUT YOU DIDN'T 
KINC 
WAS 
HAVE 
TYPE OF BIKE -- I MEAN DID 
) TO THIS BIKE? 
HE 
) OF LIGHT AT ALL ON THE BIKE? 
YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ! 
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
RECROSS 
KNOW WHAT 
-EXAMINATION 
THE LAW WAS, CORRECT? 
LAW 
HAVE 
AT 
YOU 
THE 
— 
YOU WERE WRONG ~ 
A. YES. 
Q. — ON YOUR ASSUMPTION. 
A. I WAS. I WAS. 
Q. WHEN DID YOU PREPARE YOUR WRITTEN REPORT? 
A. PROBABLY RIGHT AFTER WE GOT DONE WITH BOOKING HIM INTO 
JAIL. 
Q. SO THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN AUGUST 31ST? 
A. YEAH. YEAH, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. IF — I MEAN IT 
WOULDN'T HAVE FALLEN INTO SEPTEMBER 1ST BECAUSE IT WAS — I 
MEAN THERE WASN'T THAT TIME GAP. 
29 
Q. Alii." 111 YuUR 
STOPPED THE MALE 
CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S WHAT 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
MS. BEATON: 
THE COURT: 
WITNESSES? 
: BEATON: 
j THE COURT: 
MR. GRAVIS: 
THE COURT: 
THEN? 
MS. BEATON: 
M l 1 l..l''J'i" 1 
THE COURT: 
WRITTEN RERuRT, SECOND PARAGRAPH SAYS, I 
IN THE 1600 BLOCK OF WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, 
IT — YES, SIR. 
NOTHING FURTHER. 
ANYTHING ELSE? 
NOTHING FURTHER. 
THANK YOU. YOU CAN STEP DOWN. ANY OTHER 
NO, YOUR HONOR. 
DOES THE DEFENSE PLAN ON PUTTING ANY 
NO, YOUR HONOR. 
OKAY. AND YOU WANNA RESET THIS FOR ARGUMENT 
YES, PLEASE. 
i 1 I I . 
AND YOU'RE GONNA FILE SOMETHING. I DON'T 
'"!OW WHAT Vi'IlR TIME S'~"ALK I: i ^ P TIME FRAME. 
| MS. BEATON: WEI,],, THE DEFENDANT'S OUT OF CUSTODY. I 
GUESS I'D , Jl 1ST ASK FOR (UNINTELLIGIBLE) WEEKS. 
TIE IE COURT: OKAY. I'M NOT SURE, I DONf T HAVE MY 
CALENDAR. I DIDN'T KNOW WE WERE GONNA SET ANYTHING, SO IF WE 
i JEI ,i • i J: : i I ' T Tf in: JI : WE NEED TO C o TI IAT 
BUT OKAY. WHY DIDN'T YOU I IAVE IT FILED BY MARCH 8TH THEN 
30 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TIME TO REPLY? 
MR. GRAVIS: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. COULD YOU HAVE IT BY THE 18TH OF 
MARCH? THAT'S ABOUT TEN DAYS. WHY DON'T WE JUST SET IT ON 
MY LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR FOR APRIL 5TH AT TWO. WILL THAT 
WORK FOR EVERYBODY? 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'LL BE FINE. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK IT'LL BE AN EXTENSIVE 
ARGUMENT. SHOULD BE -- I MEAN I THINK BY THAT TIME IT'LL ALL 
BE LAID OUT FAIRLY CLEARLY AND WE'VE HEARD THE EVIDENCE, SO I 
WOULD ANTICIPATE IT'D BE FAIRLY SHORT ARGUMENT. SO I THINK 
WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO IT ON A REGULAR LAW AND MOTION THEN. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
MS. BEATON: THANK YOU. 
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THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH VERSUS VAL TEHERO, 41905050. 
MR. ALLEN: THIS IS ON FOR DECISION, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OH, I'M SORRY. IS HE STILL HERE? 
(ANOTHER CASE WAS CALLED.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. RECALL VAL TEHERO. ALL RIGHT. THIS 
IS THE TIME SET FOR DECISION IN THE CASE. I TOOK IT UNDER 
ADVISEMENT AFTER HEARING ORAL — 
MR. ALLEN: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: -- ARGUMENT ON ONE DAY AND EVIDENCE ON 
ANOTHER DAY. I'VE DETERMINED TO DENY THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE WAS WHETHER THERE WAS ACTUALLY A STOP, 
A LEVEL TWO SITUATION. IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH THE OFFICER 
PULLED UP BEHIND MR. TEHERO, WHO WAS OPERATING HIS BICYCLE AT 
A LATE EVENING HOURS ON THE — ON THE SIDEWALK, HE DID NOT 
ACTIVATE HIS LIGHTS, HE DIDN'T ACTIVATE HIS SIREN, HE DIDN'T 
TELL THE DEFENDANT TO STOP, HE DIDN'T INDICATE IN ANY WAY 
THAT HE WAS DETAINING THE DEFENDANT. THE DEFENDANT STOPPED, 
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY, AND IT'S NOT DISPUTED, 
HE STOPPED ON HIS OWN. LOOKED BACK. THE OFFICER THEN ASKED 
HIM WHAT HIS NAME WAS AND ASKED FOR SOME INFORMATION, I 
GUESS. DIDN'T TELL HIM HE COULDN'T LEAVE. AGAIN, DIDN'T --
THERE WERE NO OTHER OFFICERS ON THE SCENE. AND GRANTED, IT 
WAS FOCUSSED ON THIS DEFENDANT, THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT 
THAT, BUT THE ISSUE WAS, WAS HE FREE TO LEAVE. THAT IS THE 
3 
SOLE ISSUE THAT WAS ARGUED AT THE — BY MR. GRAVIS. 
YOU'RE ACTING LIKE --
WELL, I -- I JUST DON'T — 
-- MR. ALLEN, THAT YOU'RE --
I'M NOT GONNA ARGUE IT BECAUSE I'VE GONE 
MR. ALLEN: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLEN: 
THROUGH IT, BUT I — 
THE COURT: YEAH --
MR. ALLEN: -- I CAN'T SEE HOW ANYBODY WOULD HAVE FELT 
THAT THEY COULD JUST WALK — 
THE COURT: WELL, THE STATE --
MR. ALLEN: -- RIDE OFF ON THEIR BIKE --
THE COURT: -- THE STAN -- THE STANDARD IS WOULD A 
REASONABLE PERSON FEEL THAT THEY COULD LEAVE THE SCENE --
MR. ALLEN: RIGHT, AND I DON'T BELIEVE A SINGLE PERSON 
WOULD HAVE --
THE COURT: IN THIS SITUATION -- I'LL GO OVER IT AGAIN 
SO IT'S CLEAR FOR THE RECORD IN CASE IT GETS APPEALED. THERE 
WAS NO STOP BY THE OFFICER. THE OFFICER DID NOT ACTIVATE HIS 
LIGHTS. HE DIDN'T ACTIVATE HIS SIREN. HE SIMPLY PULLED 
UP -- SIREN. HE SIMPLY PULLED UP IN THE AREA BEHIND THE 
DEFENDANT. THE DEFENDANT, APPARENTLY THINKING THAT IT WAS 
DIRECTED AT HIM, STOPPED HIS BICYCLE, COOPERATED WITH THE 
OFFICER WHEN HE ASKED FOR — THE OFFICER ASKED FOR 
INFORMATION. I CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT PERHAPS MR. TEHERO 
STOPPED BECAUSE THERE WAS AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT, HE THOUGHT 
1 HE MIGHT BE WANTED ON IT. I CAN'T — I DON'T KNOW. BUT AT 
2 THAT TIME THE OFFICER DIDN'T TELL HIM THERE'S A WARRANT, 
3 STOP, YOU'RE UNDER ARREST. DIDN'T INDICATE HE WAS DETAINING 
4 HIM IN ANY WAY. DID NOT TAKE ANY ITEMS FROM HIS PERSON. 
5 DIDN'T TAKE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE, HIS IDENTIFICATION CARD, OR 
6 ANY OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE DEFENDANT. AND THE 
7 DEFENDANT VERY WELL MAY HAVE THOUGHT, WELL, MAYBE I SHOULDN'T 
8 LEAVE. BUT THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS HE WAS FREE TO LEAVE. 
9 AND IT WASN'T -- A REASONABLE PERSON SHOULD HAVE REALIZED 
10 THAT THEY WERE FREE TO LEAVE. AS I SAID, MR. TEHERO MAY HAVE 
11 FELT HE — HE SHOULDN'T LEAVE BECAUSE HE KNEW HE WAS THE ONE 
12 THAT KNEW HE HAD THE WARRANT OUT, AND HE STAYED. BUT UNDER 
13 THE CASE LAW THAT'S BEEN CITED, THERE'S ABSO — IF AN OFFICER 
14 CAN'T STOP OR AT LEAST ASK SOMEBODY QUESTION UNDER THESE 
15 CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK WE'RE -- WE'VE EXTENDED THE STANDARD 
16 TO THE POINT WHERE IT SHOULD BE THAT THE OFFICER SIMPLY 
17 CANNOT STOP ANYBODY AND TALK TO 'EM. AND THAT'S MY OPINION 
18 OF THE CASE. 
19 MR. ALLEN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
20 THE COURT: YOU KNOW, THERE'S FINE LINES BETWEEN THESE 
21 SITUATIONS AND, YOU KNOW, I — I THINK AT SOME POINT YOU'VE 
22 GOTTA SAY THAT THERE IS AT LEAST SOME ROOM FOR A SITUATION 
23 LIKE THIS TO CONSTITUTE A LEVEL ONE SITUATION. AND I GUESS 
24 IT'S APPEALABLE SHOULD WE GET TO THAT POINT. LET'S SET IT 
25 FOR TRIAL. HOW MANY DAYS FOR TRIAL? 
5 
MS. BEATON: I BELIEVE IT'S MR. GRAVIS — 
MR. ALLEN: IT IS MR. GRAVIS"S CASE. HE'LL NEED --
MS. BEATON: I ASSUME YOU DON'T HAVE HIS CALENDAR? 
MR. ALLEN: I DON'T. 
THE COURT: JUST SET IT JUNE 15TH AT NINE O'CLOCK FOR 
TRIAL. FINAL PRETRIAL JUNE 7TH AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK. 
MS. BEATON: IF IT DOES GO TO — 
THE COURT: AT TWO O'CLOCK. 
MS. BEATON: -- TRIAL, I THINK THAT -- I AM THE HANDLING 
ATTORNEY. I THINK IT'S GONNA TAKE TWO DAYS. 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) THE 15TH AND 16TH THEN? 
THE COURT: IT'S GONNA TAKE TWO DAYS FOR THE CASE LIKE 
THIS, YOU THINK? 
MS. BEATON: WELL, I MEAN IF THEY DON'T STIPULATE — I 
HAVEN'T TALKED TO MR. GRAVIS, BUT IF THEY DON'T STIPULATE TO 
THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY ON THE METH AND THE LAB AND THAT KIND OF 
THING, WE HAVE TO BRING IN ALL SORTS OF PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: I MEAN I -- I GUESS I'M SURPRISED BECAUSE I 
ACTUALLY HEARD QUITE A BIT OF THE EVIDENCE. I'M JUST — 
WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED THAT IT COULD BE -- TAKE THAT LONG, 
BUT OKAY. JULY 5TH AND 6TH. 
MR. ALLEN: JULY 5TH AND 6TH --
THE COURT 
MR. ALLEN 
THE COURT 
RIGHT. 
-- AS OPPOSED TO THE 15TH? 
WELL, I DON'T HAVE A NEXT DAY, THAT'S THE 
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PROBLEM, 
MR. 
THE 
O'CLOCK. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
BECAUSE 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
BEDDES: 
COURT: 
I'M NOT AVAILABLE THE NEXT DAY, SO — 
AND WHEN IS THE PRETRIAL? 
PRETRIAL'S ON THE 28TH OF JUNE AT TWO 
OF MAY? 
JUNE. 
OKAY. 
TRIAL'S IN JULY. 
BUT I GUESS YOU CAN — YOU CAN TAKE IT UP TO 
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MAYBE GET ANOTHER RULING ON WHEN 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE FACT 
MR. 
KIND OF i 
THE 
MR. 
FINDER 
ALLEN: 
h THING. 
COURT: 
ALLEN: 
THINGS, HOW FAR THEY EXTEND AND THEY CAN BE 
EVEN, IF THEY WANT — 
I DON'T THINK THEY'LL DO THAT ON A — THAT 
OKAY. THANK YOU. 
ALL RIGHTIE. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
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